CONFERENCEThe presentation will outline the theoretical path from classical securitization theory to a communication-centred model for studying security discourse in Latvia’s hybrid media environment after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The starting point is the understanding that security is not only an objective condition, but also a communicative and political process: issues become “security issues” when they are publicly framed as existential or urgent threats that require special action (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998; Wæver, 1995).
Classical securitization theory is useful because it identifies the core elements of this process: a securitizing actor, a referent object, an audience and the legitimisation of extraordinary or special measures (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998). However, this model is difficult to apply directly to contemporary platform-based communication. In social media environments, security claims rarely remain single, stable statements made by one authoritative actor to one clearly identifiable audience. They are reposted, reframed, emotionally intensified, visualised and circulated across institutions, professional media, Telegram channels and audience communities.
The presentation therefore argues that securitization theory needs to be brought into conversation with sociological approaches that emphasise audience, context and power relations (Balzacq, 2005), as well as with framing theory, which helps identify how threat narratives define problems, attribute responsibility, evaluate actors and propose remedies (Entman, 1993). It also draws on hybrid media theory, which explains how political communication is shaped by interactions between older and newer media logics (Chadwick, 2017), and on platform studies, which show that platforms are not neutral containers but infrastructures that shape visibility, circulation and public value (Gillespie, 2018; van Dijck, Poell & de Waal, 2018; Poell, Nieborg & van Dijck, 2019).
The presentation introduces the Communicatively Mediated Securitization Model as an analytical framework linking three levels: communication infrastructure, threat framing and institutional outcomes. The model shifts attention from securitization as a single speech act to securitization as a mediated process of circulation, amplification and institutionalisation. This allows us to ask not only who declares something to be a security threat, but also how that security claim travels, who amplifies it, how it is transformed by platforms and how it becomes attached to media policy or political decision-making.
Latvia is treated as a theoretically important case because, after 2022, questions of media regulation, Russian-language content, public service media and audience trust increasingly moved into the security register. This creates a democratic tension: the state needs to respond to real Russian influence operations and propaganda, but it must do so without treating linguistic minorities or media audiences as security problems in themselves. The presentation therefore pays particular attention to the difference between analysing hostile influence operations and securitizing heterogeneous Russian-speaking audiences.
A key empirical and methodological challenge is Telegram. Research on Telegram shows that the platform supports channel-based broadcasting, reposting cultures and decentralised cross-channel circulation, making it important for studying how political, extremist and security-related communication travels through loosely connected publics (Urman & Katz, 2022; Peeters & Willaert, 2022). In this presentation, Telegram is therefore approached not simply as a source of messages, but as a circulation infrastructure in which securitizing functions may be distributed across several actors and channels.
The broader argument is that, in hybrid media environments, securitization should be studied not only as a declaration of threat, but as a mediated communication process. This shift makes it possible to analyse how security talk gains visibility, how it is amplified, how platforms reshape it and what happens when security discourse becomes attached to democratic media policy.
Anastasija Tetarenko-Supe is a Phd candidate in political communication, researcher and journalist. Her research interests include political communication, communicative construction of threats, media policy and journalist security.
